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1. Introduction 
 
The ports of Europe are major logistic trading hubs and have been so since the Middle Ages — 
taking in, storing, and dispatching goods and cargo from all over the world to the continental 
hinterland. With economic globalization and the growing importance of climate change and 
security threats in recent decades, the value of ports for Europe’s economies has increased and 
will continue to do so.1  Ports are major engines for growth in Europe2 and handle 90% of the 
continent’s international trade.3 Many port authorities are understandably eager to expand to fully 
realize their growth potential and adapt to new developments in international maritime 
commerce. Such expansion will give rise, however, to significant environmental impacts, such as 
habitat destruction, harmful emissions, and water pollution, often exacerbating the already 
degraded status of vulnerable estuarine ecosystems. This means that new port development must 
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3 European Commission, An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union, COM (2007) 
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be reconciled with environmental protection requirements, such as those in the EU Birds 
Directive and Habitats Directive (collectively, the “Nature Directives”).4  
Because parts of estuaries and coastal areas are often already protected as Special 
Protection Areas (SPAs) under the Birds Directive and as Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) 
under the Habitats Directive, the sites together comprising the Natura 2000 network,5 proposals 
for new port development have to be based on a thorough understanding of the protection duties 
contained in these laws.6 Most notably, Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive establishes 
procedural and substantive requirements to be followed when granting planning permission for 
projects likely to significantly damage a Natura 2000 site.7  Although there is some room for 
balancing ecological and economic concerns through the application, for example, of the 
                                                          
4 Council Directive 79/409, 1979 O.J (L 103) 1 (EEC); Council Directive 92/43, 1992 O.J. (L 
206) 7 (EEC). 
5 “Natura 2000 Network” is the term used to describe the network of protected areas set out by 
the Nature Directives. Stretching over 18 % of the EU’s land area and over almost 6% of its 
marine territory, the network is the largest coordinated network of protected areas in the world. 
Natura 2000, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/index_en.htm (last visited March 19, 2017).    
6 European Commission, Guidance on the Implementation of the Birds and Habitats Directive in 
Estuaries and Coastal Zones 9–10 (Jan. 2011), 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/Estuaries-EN.pdf (last 
visited March 19, 2017) 
7  See Peter Scott, Appropriate Assessment: A Paper Tiger, in THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE: A 
DEVELOPER’S OBSTACLE COURSE? 103 (Gregory Jones ed., 2012).  
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exception procedure in Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive,8 the implementation of this 
derogation provision has caused increasing unease and frustration among port authorities and the 
companies that work with them. When there is geographical overlap between protected marine or 
estuarine habitats and potential port extension zones, there can be a sharp rise in the level of 
conflict between development and protection interests.9  
In the past, little regard was shown for nature protection areas in ports or in places that 
might be impacted by port expansion.10 This neglect proved troublesome, however, in the face of 
                                                          
8 See Rebecca Clutten & Isabella Tafur, Are Imperative Reasons Imperiling the Habitats 
Directive? An Assessment of Article 6(4) and the IROPI Exception, in THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE: 
A DEVELOPER’S OBSTACLE COURSE? 167–182 (Gregory Jones ed., 2012). 
9 See generally ERIC VAN HOOYDONCK, THE IMPACT OF EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON PORTS AND 
WATERWAYS, INCLUDING A PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF PORTUS 2010, A COHERENT EU 
NETWORK OF STRATEGIC PORT DEVELOPMENT AREAS (2006).  
10 In its notable ruling on the port expansion in the Stour and Orwell Estuary, the United 
Kingdom declined to designate inter-tidal habitats that were eligible as SPAs because they were 
located in future port expansion zones. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) finally held the UK 
authorities should not have granted consent for development in sites that had been wrongly 
excluded from SPA consideration on socio-economic grounds. Case C-44/95, Regina v Sec’y of 
State for the Envt. ex parte Royal Soc’y for the Protection of Birds, 1996 E.C.R. I-03805. See 
also Hendrik Schoukens & Hans Woldendorp, Sites Selection and Designation under the 
Habitats and Birds Directives: A Sisyphean Task, in THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE IN ITS EU 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CONTEXT: EUROPEAN NATURE’S BEST HOPE? 31–55 (Charles-Hubert Born 
et al. eds., 2015).  
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increased judicial scrutiny of development proposals in national and EU courts in light of the 
protection duties set out by the Nature Directives.11 Notwithstanding the fact that varying 
standards of review have been applied by national courts that were increasingly asked to respond 
to challenges to development proposals,12 the particularly sharp rise in the number of legal 
challenges to the construction of new port facilities suggests that this is an especially sensitive 
subject.13 Although for the most part legal proceedings do not succeed in blocking the 
construction of new port facilities, they do create increased business risks and time delays.14  
This is the context in which an integrated approach to nature conservation in port areas 
has been explored – an approach in which biodiversity offsets and restoration actions might play 
an increasingly important role for aligning further expansion with nature conservation. Offsets 
are compensatory actions intended to repair the residual impacts that a development will have on 
                                                          
11 Hendrik Schoukens & Kees Bastmeijer, Species Protection in the European Union: How Strict 
is Strict?, in THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE IN ITS EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CONTEXT: EUROPEAN 
NATURE’S BEST HOPE? 129–133 (Charles-Hubert Born et al. eds., 2015).  
12 Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith & Nicholas S.J. Watts, Wildlife Conservation and Protected 
Areas: Politics, Procedure, and the Performance of Failure Under the EU Birds and Habitats 
Directives, 17 J. OF INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 62 (2014). 
13  Roger Morris & Chris Gibson, Port Development and Nature Conservation – Experiences in 
England Between 1994 and 2005, 50 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 453 (2007). 
14 Roger Morris, The Application of the Habitats Directive in the UK: Compliance or Gold 
Plating?, 28 LAND USE POL’Y 361 (2011). 
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the environment, with the goal of achieving no net loss of biodiversity.15 Such actions might 
involve both the creation of new habitat in locations where it did not previously exist and habitat 
restoration and re-creation in places where habitats are degraded or have only recently been 
removed.16  
 In theory, if the progressive use of offsets can align projects with the substantive 
requirements of EU nature conservation law, recourse to Article 6(4) derogation procedure and 
its associated risks and delays can be avoided. The notion is that by anticipating the beneficial 
effects of new habitat creation, or other restoration or enhancement measures that are functionally 
linked to a project, when the project is assessed, developers can reduce the overall adverse 
impacts of new development to the point that they are entitled to project approval under Article 
6(3). This would effectively side-step the obstacle to development that stems from the 
unfavourable conservation status of many of the protected areas that are part of the Natura 2000 
Network.17  
The recent Regional Development Implementation Plan for the Port of Antwerp brings 
these issues into sharp focus. To offset impairments to EU protected nature sites that would result 
from the construction of a new Saeftinghe Dock on the left bank the Scheldt estuary, the port 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., Toby Gardner et al., Biodiversity Offsets and the Challenge of Achieving a No Net Loss, 
27 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1254 (2013).  
16 Roger Morris et al., The Creation of Compensatory Habitat – Can it Secure Sustainable 
Development?, 14 J. FOR NATURE CONSERVATION 106 (2006).  
17  See Hendrik Schoukens & An Cliquet, Mitigation and Compensation under EU Nature 
Conservation Law in the Flemish Region: Beyond the Deadlock for Development Projects, 
UTRECHT L. REV., May 2014, at 194.  
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authority proposed an integrated nature creation scheme that would arguably achieve the 
conservation objectives of EU law more effectively than possible alternatives (Figure 1). The 
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) disagreed and ruled in its 2016 Orleans decision that the 
nature creation scheme was incompatible with the preventative approach to nature conservation 
that is at the heart of the Habitats Directive.18 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
This article analyses the legal and factual underpinnings of the Orleans case, outlining the 
most relevant legal considerations to be taken into account when integrating habitat restoration 
and creation efforts in a spatial planning procedure. It also points to some broader lessons that 
can be learned about the use of habitat creation and restoration measures to make port 
development, and by extension other major development proposals, more consonant with EU 
nature protection law as the CJEU has now defined it.  
 
2. A Simple Theory: Article 6 of the Habitats Directive as a Benchmark for Project 
Development in the Context of Natura 2000 
Article 6 of the Habitats Directive contains the basic protection rules for Natura 2000 sites and 
serves as a logical starting point for a legal analysis of the leeway that is left for project 
development under European law. Most importantly, the assessment rules included in Articles 
                                                          
18 Joined Cases C-387/15 & C-388/15, Hilde Orleans and Others v. Vlaams Gewest, 2016 EUR-
Lex 583 (July 21, 2016). 
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6(3) and 6(4) of the Directive establish whether future port developments are likely to be 
jeopardized because they endanger the long-term survival and/or recovery of the coastal and 
estuarine habitats present where development is planned. However, the more generic 
conservation duties laid down in Article 6(1) and 6(2) also have an important bearing on the 
room left for harmful development in the context of Natura 2000. 
Text of Article 6, Habitats Directive 
1. For special areas of conservation, Member States shall establish the necessary conservation 
measures involving, if need be, appropriate management plans specifically designed for the sites 
or integrated into other development plans, and appropriate statutory, administrative or 
contractual measures which correspond to the ecological requirements of the natural habitat types 
in Annex I and the species in Annex II present on the sites. 
2. Member States shall take appropriate steps to avoid, in the special areas of conservation, the 
deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species as well as disturbance of the species 
for which the areas have been designated, in so far as such disturbance could be significant in 
relation to the objectives of this Directive. 
3. Any plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of the site but 
likely to have a significant effect thereon, either individually or in combination with other plans 
or projects, shall be subject to appropriate assessment of its implications for the site in view of 
the site's conservation objectives. In the light of the conclusions of the assessment of the 
implications for the site and subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the competent national 
authorities shall agree to the plan or project only after having ascertained that it will not adversely 
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affect the integrity of the site concerned and, if appropriate, after having obtained the opinion of 
the general public. 
4. If, in spite of a negative assessment of the implications for the site and in the absence of 
alternative solutions, a plan or project must nevertheless be carried out for imperative reasons of 
overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature, the Member State shall 
take all compensatory measures necessary to ensure that the overall coherence of Natura 2000 is 
protected. It shall inform the Commission of the compensatory measures adopted. 
Where the site concerned hosts a priority natural habitat type and/or a priority species, the only 
considerations which may be raised are those relating to human health or public safety, to 
beneficial consequences of primary importance for the environment or, further to an opinion from 
the Commission, to other imperative reasons of overriding public interest. 
 
2.1. Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive: The Positive Conservation Principle 
Under Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive, Member States have an obligation for positive 
conservation, meaning that they are required to take the conservation measures necessary to 
ensure continuation of the habitat types and species present on sites listed for protection in 
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Annexes I and II of the Directive.19 This provision is only applicable to SACs.20 The listed sites 
must be maintained at a favourable conservation status or, as the case may be, must be restored to 
that status.21  Article 6(1) thus has an important bearing on what Member States are required to 
do for Natura 2000 sites that currently have an unfavourable conservation status.22  
While the Directive is silent on the question of whether favourable conservation status 
must be achieved at the individual site level or in aggregate at the national level,23 there is no 
                                                          
19 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Managing Natura 2000 Sites, The Provisions of Article 6 of the 
‘Habitats’ Directive 92/43/ECC 16 (2000), 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/art6/provision_of_art6_en.
pdf (last visited March 19, 2017).   
20 However, according to Article 4(1) of the Birds Directive, the species mentioned in Annex I 
shall be the subject of special conservation measures concerning their habitat in order to ensure 
their survival and reproduction in their area of distribution. Council Directive 79/409, 1979 O.J 
(L 103) 1 (EEC). 
21 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Establishing Conservation Measures for Natura 2000 Sites (2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/conservation%20measures.
pdf.  
22 Hendrik Schoukens, Atmospheric Nitrogen Deposition and the Habitats Directive: Tinkering 
with the Law in the Face of the Precautionary Principle? NORDIC ENVTL. L. J., NO. 2., 25, 28–29 
(2015).  
23 However, the CJEU seems to indicate that the conservation objectives are not only to be achieved 
at national level but must also be realized at individual site level. See Case C-258/11, Sweetman 
and Others v. Pleanála, 2013 EUR-Lex 220, para. 46; see also Hendrik Schoukens, The Ruling of 
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question that Member States must consider ambitious recovery programmes for Natura 2000 sites 
that now have unfavourable conservation status because of past environmental degradation.24 
According to the 2015 Nature Report, 85% of the EU’s wetland habitats and 66% of the EU’s 
marine habitats currently have an unfavourable conservation status,25 which is why port 
authorities have to take the adverse effects of port expansion as well as their autonomous nature 
recovery and restoration duties very seriously. Whenever protected coastal or marine habitats are 
already degraded due to a combination, for instance, of dredging, habitat fragmentation, and land 
conversion in prior decades, restoration objectives must be set at site level. In cases where active 
on-site management measures have already been implemented or where previous damage 
substantially limits the room for recovery, more robust and ambitious restoration or re-creation 
measures may be needed. They could include the re-creation of previously lost wetlands, mud 
flats, and tidal marshes.  
Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive does not establish an explicit deadline for the 
achievement of favourable conservation status for adversely affected protected areas. The CJEU 
recently indicated, however, that conservation and restoration measures need to be put in place no 
                                                          
the Court of Justice in Sweetman: How to Avoid a Death by a Thousand Cuts?, ELNI REVIEW 2 
(2014). 
24 An Cliquet, Kris Decleer & Hendrik Schoukens, Restoring Nature in the EU: The Only Way is 
Up? in THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE IN ITS EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CONTEXT 275 (Charles Hubert 
Born et. al., eds. 2015). 
25 EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, STATE OF NATURE IN THE EU: RESULTS FROM THE 
REPORTING UNDER THE NAT http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/state-of-nature-in-the-eu (last 
visited March 19, 2017).. 
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fewer than six years after a Natura 2000 site is added to the list of Sites of Community 
Importance.26 These conservation and restoration duties apply irrespective of the presence of 
future expansion plans, which might be prone to further exacerbating the conservation status of 
the protected habitats or species present in the port area.  
 
2.2. Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive: The Non-Regression Principle 
Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive requires Member States to take appropriate steps to avoid 
the deterioration of natural habitats and the disturbance of species. This obligation to protect 
nature under a non-regression principle plays an increasing role in determining how much room 
for manoeuvre Member States have when contemplating development projects, especially 
harbour expansions in estuaries that are already degraded.  
At first sight, the standard of protection imposed by Article 6(2) appears to be relatively 
high.27 Although there is some confusion about whether Member States have to prohibit all forms 
of deterioration, including those that may not give rise to significant impacts on a Natura 2000 
site, the CJEU has held that “the provisions of Article 6(2) and (3) of the Habitats Directive must 
be construed as a coherent whole in the light of the conservation objectives pursued by the 
directive and (…) are designed to ensure the same level of protection of natural habitats and 
habitats of species.”28  
                                                          
26 Case C-90/10, Comm’n v. Spain, 2011 E.C.R. I-134, para. 64.  
27 Article 6(2) of the Habitats Directive does, however, only rule out disturbances to protected 
species “in so far as such disturbance could be significant in relation to the objectives of that 
directive.” Council Directive 92/43, 1992 O.J. (L 206) 7 (EEC). 
28 Case C-258/11, 2013 EUR-Lex 220, at para. 33.  
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Thus, Member States are not allowed to exempt certain categories of activities, such as 
the on-going maintenance of harbours by dredging, from the application of this non-regression 
principle.29 Even on-going activities, like dredging actions necessary to ensure continued 
operation of and access to the port facilities, that were authorized before coastal zones or 
estuarine habitats were designated as Natura 2000 sites have to be scrutinized.30 In some 
instances, where the likelihood of significant effects cannot be excluded, there is an obligation to 
provide for ex post-monitoring of already permitted activities.31  
It is generally understood and accepted that non-regression is a strict requirement of EU 
law and that meeting this obligation may, in effect, require new nature to be created.32 Habitat 
restoration or re-creation measures can also be used if they are necessary to reverse on-going 
deterioration.33 Moreover, the CJEU has held that in some instances Member States may be 
obligated to declassify a Natura 2000 site if it is irretrievably unsuitable to meet the objectives of 
the Habitats Directive.34 This step must be accompanied, however, by a finding that the 
degradation in question is the result of a failure in previous years to enforce the protection duties 
included in other Articles of the Directive. In other words, the mere fact that the environmental 
                                                          
29 See, e.g., Case C-241/08, Comm'n v. France, 2010 E.C.R. I-01697, paras. 38–39.  
30 See Case C-226/08, Stadt Papenburg, 2010 E.C.R. I-131, para. 49; Case C-404/09, Comm’n v. 
Spain, 2011 E.C.R. I-11853, paras. 114–60.  
31 Case C-399/14, Grüne Liga Sachsen eV and Others v. Freistaat Sachsen (CJEU, Jan. 14, 2016), 
paras. 40–46. 
32 Case C-133/00, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2002 E.C.R. I-5335, para. 31.  
33 Cliquet, Decleer & Schoukens, supra note 26, at 277.  
34 Case C-301/12, Cascina Tre Pini Ss (CJEU, 3 April 2014), para. 32.  
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condition of an estuarine area is deteriorating is not sufficient to declassify it as a protected site 
and could instead warrant the implementation of additional restoration efforts to halt further 
deterioration. 
 
2.3. Articles 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive: The No Net Loss Principle 
Articles 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive set out procedural and substantive assessment 
duties for plans or projects that are not directly connected with or necessary for the management 
of a Natura 2000 site. These rules do not impose a general ban on economic development 
activities.35 Their ecological focus does, however, substantially affect the leeway that planning 
authorities have for issuing permits for developments that might harm a site,36 and in recent years 
they have had a marked impact on approval procedures for new developments in Europe’s 
ports.37 It is established case law that before a proposed plan or project can be approved it must 
go through a thorough screening process, or what is called an appropriate assessment, in all those 
cases where there is the possibility, on the basis of objective information, that the proposal will 
have a significant effect on a protected site, either by itself or in combination with other projects 
or plans.38 The appropriate assessment must entail scientifically based analysis and be based on 
                                                          
35 Case C-2/10 Azienda Agro-Zootecnica Franchini Sarl, 2011 E.C.R. I-6561, para. 46.  
36 See Scott, supra note 9, at 103.  
37 See ERIC VAN HOOYDONK, THE IMPACT OF EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON PORTS AND 
WATERWAYS (2006). 
38 Case C-127/02, Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee en Nederlandse 
Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels v. Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en 
Visserij, 2004 E.C.R. I-7405, para. 44.   
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concrete, relevant, and precise information.39 Potentially cumulative effects linked to existing 
environmental pressures, such as dredging activities or the operation of industrial activities in 
port areas, must also be taken into account.  
In its landmark ruling in Waddenzee, the CJEU stressed that the authorisation criterion 
laid down in the second sentence of Article 6(3) rests on the precautionary principle.40 Competent 
national authorities are, therefore, permitted to allow projects or plans to go forward only if they 
are quite certain, in the light of the applicable conservation objectives and the appropriate 
assessment, that there will be no adverse effects on the integrity of a protected site.41 This 
stringent view has been reaffirmed by the CJEU in subsequent cases42 and it clearly puts the 
burden of proof on the proponents of potentially harmful developments.43 The CJEU has also said 
that proper weight needs to be given to the impact of a plan or project on site-specific 
                                                          
39 Case C-441/03, Comm’n v. The Netherlands, 2005 E.C.R I-3043, para. 22.  
40 Case C-127/02, 2004 E.C.R. I-7405, at para. 58. 
41 Id. at 59. 
42 See, e.g., Case C-43/10, Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Aitoloakarnanias and Others v. Ypourgos 
Perivallontos, Chorotaxias kai Dimosion ergon and Others 2012 EUR-Lex 560 (Sept. 11, 2012), 
paras. 109–15. 
43 RALPH FRINS & HENDRIK SCHOUKENS, Balancing Wind Energy and Nature Protection: From 
Policy Conflicts Towards Genuine Sustainable Development, in SUSTAINABLE ENERGY UNITED IN 
DIVERSITY – CHALLENGES AND APPROACHES IN ENERGY TRANSITION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 84 
(L. Squitani, H. Vedder & B. Vanheusden eds., 2014). 
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conservation objectives44 and that a more relaxed view of how to protect the integrity of a site 
would collide with the Directive’s precautionary approach.45   
As a matter of principle, then, development projects that render the protection or, in a 
context of severe degradation,  restoration of a site unsustainable must be rejected. Article 6(4) 
does stipulate, though, that development can proceed even in the face of a negative assessment. 
But this can only happen if there is no alternative solution, if the project is deemed to be 
necessary for imperative reasons of overriding public interest (IROPI), and if all the 
compensatory measures needed to ensure the overall coherence of the Natura 2000 network have 
been taken.46 These derogation provisions of the Habitats Directive are supposed to be used only 
as a last resort,47 and recent decisions have emphasized that compliance with the three conditions 
for derogation will be strictly reviewed.48  
 
                                                          
44 Case C-127/02, 2004 E.C.R. I-7405, at para. 47. 
45 Case C-258/11, 2013 EUR-Lex 220, at para. 39–46. 
46 See generally Clutten & Tafur, supra note 10, at 167. 
47 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidance Document on Article 6(4) of the ‘Habitats Directive’ 
92/43/EEC, Clarification of the Concepts of: Alternative Solutions, Imperative Reasons of 
Overriding Public Interest, Compensatory Measures, Overall Coherence, Opinion of the 
Commission 11 (Jan. 2007), 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/art6/guidance_art6_4_en.p
df (last visited 19 March, 2017). 
48 FRINS & SCHOUKENS, supra note 45, at 93–95. 
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3. A Complex Reality: The Socio-Economic and Ecological Roots of the Proactive Nature 
Management Approach Developed for the Port of Antwerp  
 
3.1. A Short History Lesson: Unfettered Expansion at the Cost of Nature and Villages 
The Port of Antwerp, currently Europe’s second largest seaport in total freight shipped after 
Rotterdam, is situated on the banks of the River Scheldt in Belgium, about 88 kilometres from the 
North Sea.49 Evidence for the existence of a port at Antwerp is dated to the 12th century.50 Much 
later, Antwerp’s potential as major hub was recognized by Napoleon, who ordered the 
construction of Antwerp’s first lock and dock in 1811. By the early 20th century, eight docks had 
been constructed. They survived the Second World War without major damage. The Belgian 
government subsequently launched a ten-year plan to expand the port northwards through the 
construction of both additional docks and related industrial complexes. Bigger locks were built to 
accommodate large container ships. Along the way, three villages, Oosterweel, Wilmarsdonk, 
and Oorderen, standing in the way of development, were demolished, and their populations 
relocated to neighbouring towns, and without much regard to the loss of valuable estuarine 
habitat and species.  
 
3.2. Learning by Doing: The Obstacle Course to the Construction of the Deurganck Dock 
(1997–2005)  
                                                          
49 For more information, see Port of Antwerp, WIKIPEDIA (Feb. 14, 2017, 1:43 PM), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_of_Antwerp.  
50 For more background on the historical development of the Port of Antwerp, see History of the 
Port of Antwerp, http://www.portofantwerp.com/en/history-port (last visited March 19, 2017).  
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Starting in the 1960s, the focus of development at the port shifted to the left bank of the river, 
dubbed “Waaslandhaven,” due to its location in the polder region of Waasland in the Belgian 
Province of East Flanders. The initially ambitious plans for a Waaslandhaven, which 
encompassed the construction of the Baalhoek Canal, which would have run from Kallo in 
Belgium through the Drowned Land of Saefthinge (on Dutch territory) into the Western Scheldt, 
had to be revised, however, because of the economic downturn in the 1970s.51 By the end of the 
next decade a more modest Waaslandhaven had emerged (see Fig. 1). Operations there began in 
the 1990s. Up to this point in time, development plans for the port had faced no significant legal 
challenges, and expansion plans did not need to be adjusted to account for either existing human 
settlements (villages) or valuable marshlands or mudflats (nature reserves). This relatively 
unfettered process of development came to an abrupt halt with the proposed construction of a 
new tidal dock complex, the Deurganck Dock, in the 1990s.  
This dock was to be more than 5 km long and would entail the destruction of the village 
of Doel, a 700-year-old settlement along the Scheldt and adjacent to estuarine marshlands 
designated as a SPA and a SAC by the Flemish Government, which has within the Belgian 
constitutional system received legislative and executive powers in fields that are connected to its 
territory, such as the environment, nature conservations and country and land use planning,52 
                                                          
51 CARINE Goossens, Edmond Reyn, Tim Soens, Richard Willems &Ludo Goossens,  DOEL, 
POLDERDORP EN OMGEVING (2015).   
52 As a result of a process of gradual federalisation, Belgium is now a federal state composed of 
three regions and three (language) communities. Below the regions, there are provinces and 
municipalities. Since the 1980s, matters relating to the environment, nature conservation, and 
land use planning largely fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regions.  
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under the EU Nature Directives.53 Construction was temporarily halted by legal challenges 
brought by a coalition of environmental NGOs and village inhabitants, who alleged that they had 
received formal promises during the 1970s that the village would remain untouched by any 
further expansion of the Waaslandhaven. In a landmark decision, the Belgian Council of State 
held in July 2002 that, since Article 6 of the Habitats Directive had direct effect within the 
Flemish legal order, the Flemish Government could not use an area proposed for designation as a 
Site of Community Interest (SCI) under the Habitats Directive as compensation for impairments 
to existing protected areas caused by the construction of the new dock.54 Other NGOs filed 
complaints with the European Commission, arguing that no appropriate assessment had been 
carried out for the project as required by Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, and that there 
were no proposals to compensate for the loss of biodiversity the project would cause.55 The 
matter was urgent because work was already underway.56 In the face of these pending legal 
challenges before the Belgian Council of State, the Flemish government decided to ratify the 
                                                          
53 See Hendrik Schoukens & Hans Woldendorp, Juridische Moeilijkheden bij Proactieve 
Natuurontwikkeling: Een Laatste Reddingsboei voor het Polderdorpje Doel?, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
OMGEVINGSRECHT EN – BELEID 97–118 (2014); see also Nina Siegal, Last Holdouts Struggle to 
Stop Destruction of a Belgian Village, N.Y. TIMES (April 27, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/world/europe/belgium-east-flanders-doel.html?_r=0. 
54 Conseil d’État [CE] [Council of State], 2002, No. 2109.563, http://www.conseildetat.be 
(Belg.).  
55 See Geert Van Hoorick, Natuurbeschermingsrecht. Recente Wetgeving en Rechtspraak 
Ingevolge de Europese Vogel- en Habitatrichtlijn, NIEUW JURIDISCH WEEKBLAD 1318–22 (2003). 
56 Id. 
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planning permits legislatively by adopting an Urgency Decree.57 The works were deemed to be of 
overriding public interest under Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive and an ambitious 
compensation plan was put forward consisting of both temporary and permanent offset areas 
totalling some 1,200 hectares that arguably could achieve the conservation objectives established 
for the Scheldt Estuary. Annual progress reports on the compensation plan would have to be 
provided to a monitoring committee representing the Flemish Parliament and other relevant 
actors.58 In the light of, among other things, the compensation plan for the Deurganck Dock, the 
halting of further expansion northwards, and pledges by the Flemish government to do a better 
job of implementing the Habitats Directive, the European Commission agreed to halt pending 
infringement proceedings.59 And the Belgian Constitutional Court declared that the compensation 
measures met the requirements of Article 6(4).60  
                                                          
57 Flemish Decree of 14 December 2014 concerning several building permits to which imperative 
reasons of overriding public interest apply, BELGIAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 2000.  
58 These monitoring results can be consulted on the website of the monitoring committee. See 
BEHEERSCOMMISSIE NATUUR LINKERSCHELDEOEVER [LEFT BANK NATURE MANAGEMENT 
COMMITTEE], http://linkerscheldeoever.beheercommissienatuur.be (last visited March 19, 2017).  
59 Hendrik Schoukens, Peter De Smedt & An Cliquet, The Implementation of the Habitats 
Directive in Belgium (Flanders): Back to the Origin of Species?, 2 J. FOR EUR. ENVTL. AND 
PLANNING L. 127, 134–35 (2007). 
60 See Cour d’Arbitrage, 2002, No. 2002/147 (Belg.); Cour d’Arbitrage, 2003, No. 2003/94 
(Belg.); Cour d’Arbitrage, 2003, No. 2003/151 (Belg.). 
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When a plan was adopted in 2005 to consolidate all the changes stemming from the 
litigation, the Council of State rejected new lawsuits.61 However, the Council also decided in 
2012 to quash the previous decision, suspended in 2002, to relocate the village of Doel.62 The 
remaining inhabitants, who numbered only twenty, would be able to stay until the new harbour 
expansion went ahead.63  
 
3.3. Towards a More Proactive Nature Restoration Approach: From Strategic Vision (2006) 
to Regional Development Implementation Plan (2013) 
The Strategic Vision for the Port of Antwerp, adopted in 2006, imagined how the development of 
the port and associated transport facilities might play out up to the year 2030.64 Further expansion 
northwards would occupy an additional 1,000 hectares, particularly to accommodate a new, 
large-scale tidal dock, called the Saeftinghe Dock, to be built where the village of Doel is now 
located (see Fig. 1). To circumvent the legal problems that had arisen with the earlier Deurganck 
Dock, the port authority proposed to consider nature conservation interests proactively to achieve 
                                                          
61 Conseil d’État [CE] [Council of State], 2007, No. 166.439 (Belg.); Conseil d’État [CE] 
[Council of State], 2009, No. 191.266 (Belg.). 
62 Conseil d’État [CE] [Council of State], 2012, No. 200.004 (Belg.). 
63 Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal], Ghent, May 25, 2012 (Belg.).  
64
 VLAAMS MINISTERIE VAN MOBILITEIT EN OPENBARE WERKEN, DEPARTEMENT MOBILITEIT EN 
OPENBARE WERKEN, AFDELING HAVEN- EN WATERBELEID, Tussentijds Strategisch Plan Haven 
van Antwerpen (2006).  
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the conservation objectives for the SACs and SPAs that are present in the areas into which the 
port would expand.65  
In the strategic environmental impact assessment for the port’s long-term plan, several 
alternatives were studied.66 The zero-alternative and a consolidation scenario had the least 
damaging impact in terms of nature conservation, environment, and existing settlements, and thus 
should logically stand out as the most sustainable port development options.67 Scenarios 
according to which the port area would be consolidated, with new developments integrated 
within the existing boundaries of the port area were rejected as unviable alternatives, however, 
because without the new Saeftinghe Dock the port could not keep pace with projections for 
economic growth.68 The alternative that was eventually deemed most acceptable did slightly 
reduce the size of the dock in order to leave one valuable nature area, Putten West, untouched. 
Otherwise, the anticipated new developments would lead to the loss of 20 hectares of tidal 
mudflats and tidal marshes (SAC) and to the destruction of 50 hectares of grasslands at Putten-
                                                          
65 AEOLUS/AFDELING NATUUR, Achtergrondnota Natuur Haven (2006).  
66 STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT ABOUT THE DEMARCATION OF THE PORT OF 
ANTWERP AND ITS SURROUNDINGS (March 7, 2009), available at 
http://doc.ruimtevlaanderen.be/GRUP/00400/00442_00001/data/RUP_02000_212_00442_00001
_PLNMER_tekst.pdf (last visited March 19, 2017). 
67 Id. at 183.  
68 See FLEMISH GOVERNMENT, Toelichtingsnota Gewestelijk Ruimtelijk Uitvoeringsplan 
Afbakening Zeehavengebied Antwerpen 63.  
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Weide that are breeding grounds for endangered bird species (SPA), the latter one of the few 
areas in Flanders that still hosts unique sets of salt grasslands.69 
Instead of opting for derogation under Article 6(4) — a move that would have required 
the Flemish government to explicitly motivate that the long-term public interest in developing the 
new dock was greater than that in preserving the Natura 2000 sites — the consensus was that the 
port should undertake a proactive nature restoration programme. This would arguably obviate the 
delays that had arisen when Article 6(4) was invoked to complete the Deurganck Dock.70 It was 
also an option that might appear to be a sensible strategy to the stakeholders concerned about the 
already unfavourable conservation status of most SACs and SPAs. The argument would be that 
because the expansion of the harbour would be closely tied to the anticipated offset benefits of 
large-scale habitat creation, restoration, or enhancement measures, the overall environmental 
impact of the port expansion plan would not be negative. The essence of the proactive nature 
restoration scheme was that it would replace several isolated patches of habitat already suffering 
from severe degradation with one robust area of estuarine habitat close to the border with the 
Netherlands where conservation objectives could be achieved proactively.71 This approach found 
its way into the Regional Development Implementation Plan for the Port of Antwerp adopted in 
                                                          
69 For more information on this nature reserve, see Putten Weiden, BEHEERCOMMISSIE NATUUR 
LINKERSCHELDEOEVER, http://linkerscheldeoever.beheercommissienatuur.be/gebieden/putten-
weiden (last visited March 19, 2017).  
70 Schoukens & Woldendorp, supra note 54, at 103–06.  
71 The vulnerable grasslands located in Putten-Weiden would be compensated for in the 
Arenbergpolder, a newly created nature core area located in the Northern part of the Antwerp 
Port Area. 
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2013.72 Almost as soon as this plan was adopted, however, it came under fire. In fact, the Belgian 
Council of State suspended the plan in December 2013 on grounds that the conditions designed to 
ensure environmental benefits were not sufficiently integrated into the zoning prescriptions of the 
plan itself. There was no assurance that significant adverse effects would be avoided, as the 
second sentence of Article 6(3) requires.73 Although this caused quite a stir among the 
stakeholders involved in the approval process, the decision was not seen as a definitive “no go” 
for the port’s expansion, but rather as a procedural setback. In 2014 an amended version of the 
plan, including a stricter chronology for the creation of the new nature core areas, was adopted.  
 
4. A Shifting Legal Context: Nature-Inclusive Design in National and European 
Courtrooms 
In broad terms, the appeal of a proactive nature strategy is not hard to understand. It puts the 
proponents of development projects in the business of creating nature, rather than destroying it. 
Assuming the new habitats they create as an integral part of their projects are accepted as being at 
least as good as or better than the typically degraded habitats they replace, Natura 2000 sites are 
effectively removed as an obstacle to moving forward. Developers gain more flexibility in 
dealing with site-specific impacts and conservationists have some reassurance that the overall 
objectives of the protected site system are being respected. And, as a welcome side effect, the 
                                                          
72 FLEMISH GOVERNMENT,  Regional Development Implementation Plan 2013 for the Antwerp 
Port Area, available at  
https://www.ruimtevlaanderen.be/NL/Diensten/GRUPS/GRUPSDetail/rid/RUP_02000_212_004
42_00001 (last visited March 19, 2017).  
73 Conseil d’État [CE] [Council of State], 2013, No. 225.676 (Belg.). 
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derogation clause of Article 6(4), which is viewed by many private and public project developers 
as an almost insurmountable obstacle to project authorization, is rendered irrelevant.74 It does not 
come into play if appropriate assessments conclude that new habitat renders insignificant the loss 
of existing, protected habitat.    
From a legal perspective, however, the appeal of a proactive nature strategy is less clear, 
chiefly because it elides the distinction between mitigating adverse effects on the one hand and 
compensating for them on the other hand.75 The view of the European Commission on this point 
in its guidance documents has been confusing, to say the least. Although the Commission 
explicitly held in one context that mitigation measures “are aimed at minimizing or even 
cancelling the negative impact of a plan or project, during or after its completion,”76 it argued 
elsewhere that mitigation measures are aimed at “enlarging the site or creating new habitats in, or 
in direct functional relation to, a breeding site or resting place, as a counterweight to the potential 
loss of parts or functions of the site.”77 Also, it is unclear the extent to which a strict chronology 
                                                          
74 Schoukens & Cliquet (2014), supra note 19. 
75  Donald McGillivray, Compensating Biodiversity Loss: The EU Commission’s Approach to 
Compensation Under Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, 24 J. OF ENVTL. L. 417, 423 (2012); see 
also Jonathan Verschuuren, Climate Change: Rethinking Restoration in the European Union’s 
Birds and Habitats Directive, ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION 433–34 (2010). 
76 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Managing Natura 2000 Sites, The Provisions of Article 6 of the 
‘Habitats’ Directive 92/43/ECC 16 (2000), at 37. 
77 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidance on Strict Protection of Animal Species of Community 
Interest Under the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC 47–48 (Brussels, Feb. 2007), available at 
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for creating new habitat or restoring affected habitats can actually be implemented before 
damaging activities are undertaken, and to what extent this might impact the legal qualification of 
such actions.  
 
4.1. Nature Inclusive Design in National Courts: Diverging Case Law Developments? 
The Port of Antwerp was not the first place where proactive nature development was tested. The 
approach, sometimes called nature inclusive design, was first applied in the Netherlands and was 
subsequently endorsed by several national court rulings.78 In 2010, for example, the Dutch 
Council of State rejected lawsuits challenging a planning permit for the development of the 
Markermeer-IJmeer shallow-lake ecosystem. The project combined housing, recreation, surplus 
water storage, and nature conservation. To offset damage to protected sites, the project provided 
for the creation of 132 hectares of new mussel beds to help conserve affected birds. The Council 
of State had no hesitation in seeing the creation of new wetland habitat as a mitigation measure 
that could be considered in the appropriate assessment and support a finding of no significant 
effect.79 Two years later, the Council reasserted this position, accepting the construction of 22 
hectares of foraging and resting habitat as mitigation in the context of an Article 6(3) 
assessment.80 And in another landmark decision involving a proposed extension of the Port of 
                                                          
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/conservation/species/guidance/pdf/guidance_en.pdf (last 
visited March 19, 2017) (emphasis added).  
78 See Jacqueline Zijlmans and Hans Woldendorp, Compensation and Mitigation: Tinkering with 
Natura 2000 Protection Law, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 172, 173–75 (2014). 
79 ABRvS, 26 mei 2010, No. 200901224/1/R2 (Neth.). 
80 ABRvS, 8 februari 2012, No. 201100875/1/R2 (Neth.). 
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Eemshaven, the Council, again hinting at flexibility, favoured a progressive interpretation of how 
a created habitat could be assessed.81 These Dutch legal decisions coincided with the 
development of a proactive nature strategy for the Port of Antwerp, bolstering hopes for a more 
flexible understanding in Belgium of how appropriate assessments could be conducted. 
In fact, however, the Belgian courts proved less inclined to accept the progressive promise 
of nature inclusive design.82 This was strikingly illustrated in a 2013 decision about the legality 
of a permit for a road bypass that would cut through a Natura 2000 site in the province of 
Limburg. Because the project specifically included a corridor zone to offset its encroachment on 
the protected site, it was authorized without resort to the derogation clause of Article 6(4).83 In a 
final ruling on the merits, however, the Belgian Council of State took the view that the creation of 
a corridor zone could not be accepted as mitigation for the purposes of an appropriate assessment 
under Article 6(3).84  
 
4.2. Briels: A Clear Interpretation Line? 
To dispel lingering legal uncertainty about exactly how nature restoration and creation measures 
were to be treated in the context of decision-making about harmful projects under the second 
sentence of Article 6(3), the Dutch Council of State referred the matter to the CJEU for an 
                                                          
81 ABRvS, 16 april 2014, No. 201304768/1/R2 (Neth.). 
82 See Schoukens & Cliquet (2014), supra note 19, at 207–10.    
83  See Hendrik Schoukens & An Cliquet, Biodiversity Offsetting and Restoration Under the 
European Union Habitats Directive: Balancing Between No Net Loss and Deathbed 
Conservation?, 21 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y (2016).  
84 Conseil d’État [CE] [Council of State] 2013, No. 223.083 (Belg.). 
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advisory opinion. The Council wanted to know the extent to which future restoration measures 
could be regarded as mitigation in the context of an appropriate assessment for a road 
development project. In its judgment in Briels, the CJEU declared that future restoration 
measures could not, as a matter of principle, be considered in the context of an appropriate 
assessment if their purpose was to offset actual damage to protected habitats. Any other 
interpretation, it said, would be inconsistent with the preventative principle embodied in the 
Habitats Directive.85  
The CJEU based its judgment on two principal assumptions. First and foremost, it 
assumed that if the future creation of an area of equal or greater size than that adversely affected 
by a project occurred in a part of the site on which the project had no impact at all, then it could 
not sensibly be regarded as a measure taken to avoid adverse effects.86 Second, such nature 
creation measures simply attempted to counterbalance the negative impacts that the project would 
unavoidably create and they were, therefore, properly regarded under the law as compensatory 
measures within the ambit of Article 6(4).87  
This aligned the CJEU with Advocate General Sharpston, who had argued that only 
“measures which form part of a plan or project and which effectively minimize its impact may be 
taken into account when assessing, in accordance with Article 6(3), whether that plan or project 
                                                          
85 Case C-521/12, T. C. Briels v. Minister van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2014 EUR-Lex 330 (May 
15, 2014). 
86 Id. at para. 30. 
87 Id. at para. 31.  
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adversely affects the integrity of that site.”88 Compensatory measures anticipated under Article 
6(4) could, therefore, never be regarded as mitigation, not least because their beneficial effects 
would only be evident at some point in the future and were, therefore, too uncertain to be part of 
an appropriate assessment.89  
 
4.3. Towards More Scrutiny in Cases of Outright Habitat Destruction 
The impact of these case law developments quickly became apparent, both in the Netherlands 
and, to a lesser extent, in Belgium. In a 2014 case involving the extension of a golf course, for 
example, where 1.8 hectares of priority dune habitat would be destroyed in a neighbouring 
Natura 2000 site, the Dutch Council of State found that measures aimed at translocating the 
affected habitats and developing new dune habitats could not be regarded as mitigation in the 
context of an appropriate assessment.90 In a subsequent ruling, the Council again asserted that 
nature inclusive project designs do not prevent the harmful effects of a project from materializing 
in the first place.91 The same rationale was used to uphold a ruling that the irreparable loss, in a 
waterway barrier project, of 4.1 hectares of foraging areas for bitterns constituted an adverse 
                                                          
88  Case C-521/12 T.C. Briels and Others v. Minister van Intrastructuur en Milieu, Opinion (Feb. 
27, 2014), para. 32.  
89 Id. 
90 ABRvS, 24 december 2014. No. 201202327/1/R2 (Noordwijkse Golfclub) (Neth.).  
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effect on the integrity of a Dutch SPA, notwithstanding the fact that an ambitious nature 
development scheme had been integrated into the project plans.92  
 
5. Pending Questions: Adaptive Management in Port Areas as an Ultimate Solution? 
The Briels ruling from the CJEU clearly signalled that a stricter approach to the use of habitat 
restoration and re-creation measures in the context of Article 6(3) assessments was needed. As 
long as such measures are used to justify the irreparable destruction of protected patches of 
habitat, they are to be disregarded in appropriate assessments, especially where designated Natura 
2000 sites already exhibit unfavourable conservation status.93 The Flemish government remained 
convinced, however, of the legal soundness of its approach to the future development of the Port 
of Antwerp, and in response to the suspension of its expansion plan by the Belgian Council of 
State in 2013 it decided to promise that ecological core areas would be created before any project 
development in the port area went forward.94 
 
5.1. Adaptive Management in Dynamic Areas, Not Classic Mitigation or Compensation 
                                                          
92 ABRvS, 11 februari 2015, No. 20140736/1/R6, r.o. 3 (Hoogwater- geul Kampen)  
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93 FRINS & SCHOUKENS, supra note 45, at 108.  
94 FLEMISH GOVERNMENT, Regional Spatial Development Plan 2014 for the Antwerp Port Area 
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Member States are obligated to restore degraded Natura 2000 sites by Article 6(1) of the Habitats 
Directive. The Flemish government took the view, therefore, that restoration of the remaining 
nature areas within the jurisdiction of the Port of Antwerp did not make much sense, given their 
limited ability to achieve conservation objectives. The better policy was to take whatever steps 
were needed to ensure that nature conservation objectives would be met both within and outside 
designated protected areas, and then to adapt that strategy over time as circumstances changed. In 
the Netherlands, such approaches are often labelled as integrated planning or the programmatic 
approach, because they rely on a comprehensive set of measures intended to balance economic 
development with future nature recovery measures.95 
The proactive nature management strategy linked to port development in Antwerp is a 
specific application of this adaptive strategy, by locating large nature core areas on the periphery 
of the expanded port. In the revised Regional Development Implementation Plan for the harbour 
extension, a stricter chronology was also proposed, whereby the Flemish Agency for Nature and 
Forest Research would issue an opinion on whether the core areas had been successfully created, 
and construction of the Saeftinghe Dock would only proceed if these core areas could be shown 
to be sustainable. This condition would also be included in planning permits for the new port 
facilities. There would also be additional monitoring requirements, to allow the competent 
authorities to track the effectiveness of the restoration measures. 
It seems clear that an adaptive management approach to Article 6(3) could open the door 
to a more pragmatic and reconciliatory approach to nature conservation, one that would move 
appreciably beyond ‘deathbed’ conservation. Critics have argued that the Nature Directives are 
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too rigid and dogmatic, because they focus so narrowly on pre-defined conservation objectives.96 
The CJEU in particular has been criticized for its overly stringent interpretation of the Nature 
Directives and for standing in the way of a more balanced approach in which the social, 
economic, and environmental consequences of new developments can be weighed against each 
other without recourse to the rigid framework of Article 6(4). According to some commentators, 
a more flexible understanding of nature protection rules would yield greater financial resources 
and scientific expertise for nature conservation than other scenarios.97 It might also help to restore 
the legitimacy of the Nature Directives, which are, in spite of some positive biodiversity gains,98 
often depicted as overly burdensome obstacles to moving forward with proposed developments.99  
 
5.2. More Flexibility for Mobile Species in Port Areas? 
Another point of contention arises with respect to the stringent interpretation of the second 
sentence of Article 6(3), an interpretation that might be acceptable for SACs, which are 
designated to preserve the ecological characteristics of natural habitats, such as meadows and old 
growth forests, but may not fit with the more dynamic habitat types with pioneer vegetation 
associated with SPAs, where there might be more flexibility. A fortiori, the focus in SPAs is less 
                                                          
96 F.H. Kistenkas, Rethinking European Nature Conservation Legislation: Towards Sustainable 
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97 Verschuuren, supra note 77, at 436–38. 
98 See Guillaume Chapron et al., Recovery of Large Carnivores in Europe’s Modern Human-
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on the preservation and protection of breeding sites and habitats as it is on the conservation of the 
population of endangered birds that are present on site. Admittedly, the Birds Directive urges 
Member States to take the measures needed to preserve, maintain, or re-establish a sufficient 
diversity and area of habitats for all wild bird species. The chief focus, however, is on the 
maintenance and recovery of the bird populations themselves.  
In some port areas, pioneer species such as the Common Tern (Sterna hirundo), the 
Sandwich Tern (Thalasseus sandvicensis), and the Little Tern (Sternula albifrons) have adapted 
to dynamic conditions. These species typically have limited habitat requirements and quickly take 
advantage of newly emerging breeding and nesting opportunities. To conserve its population of 
terns, for example, the Port of Zeebrugge, located on the North Sea coast in Flanders, created an 
artificial tern island. The island, first created in 2005 and subsequently extended, aimed to offset 
the loss of breeding grounds elsewhere in the port area due to previous expansion works.100 The 
idea first arose in the process of designating an SPA in the Port of Zeebrugge101 and later found 
its way into the port’s strategic development plan.102 The assumption, again, was that this would 
avoid resort to the derogation clause of Article 6(4), but its feasibility depends heavily on the fact 
that terns are mobile bird species that easily colonize new pioneer habitats.  
                                                          
100 See ERIC VAN HOOYDONK, THE IMPACT OF EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON PORTS AND 
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101 Designation Decision Flemish Government (July 22, 2005). 
102 SDP 2009 Port of Zeebrugge (Gewestelijk ruimtelijk uitvoeringsplan ‘Zeehavengebied 
Zeebrugge’), https://www.ruimtelijkeordening.be/NL/Diensten/GRUPS/GRUPS-
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This flexibility in relation to SPAs is what the Dutch Council of State seemed to endorse 
when it approved a development in October 2015 that would lead to a reduction of the breeding 
grounds of several endangered woodpecker species and birds of prey. Because, according to the 
planning permit, the creation of new feeding and nesting grounds had to take place before the 
project went forward, the permit was deemed to comply with Article 6(3). Or, to put it 
differently, the preservation of the bird populations present in the SPA was more important than 
the conservation of their existing habitats.  
 
6. The 2016 Orleans Decision of the CJEU on Saeftinghe Dock: A Harsh Lesson for 
Proactive Nature Development in Port Areas? 
Against the background of the efforts made in Belgium and in Holland to use proactive nature 
management, or nature inclusive designs, to bring greater flexibility to development project 
authorizations under Article 6(3), the Orleans decision by the CJEU in July 2016 seems to be, at 
first sight, a major setback.103  
 
6.1. A Distinction Between Article 6(1) and (2) Requirements and Offsetting Measures 
The court began in Orleans by reiterating that the conservation status of a natural habitat is 
considered to be favourable104 when its natural range and the areas it covers within that range are 
stable or increasing and when the specific structure and functions needed for its long-term 
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maintenance exist, and are likely to continue to exist, into the foreseeable future.105 In Sweetman, 
the CJEU had earlier held that Member States are required to preserve the ecological 
characteristics of sites which host protected natural habitat types.106 There was no way, the CJEU 
concluded, that the measures at issue in the Antwerp port cases could be regarded as measures 
ensuring the conservation of the sites affected by the project.107 The nature restoration measures 
the port proposed to take would partially restore and recreate some degraded patches of habitat 
within the port’s jurisdiction, but the overall harbour expansion plan would also entail beyond 
that the destruction of tens of hectares of protected tidal mudflats, tidal marshes, and salt 
grasslands.108  
The restoration measures could not, therefore, be qualified as conservation measures 
within the framework of Article 6(1). Nor could they be considered as preventive measures, 
under Article 6(2), given the impairments that would be inflicted on the remaining patches of 
habitat by the future development of the port.109 The court was unwilling, in other words, to 
consider the beneficial effects of restoration measures in the context of an appropriate assessment 
for new development. Although this might seem harsh from a project developer’s point of view, 
because it basically prevents competent authorities from considering the beneficial effects of 
future restoration actions in the context of an on-going authorization for a new plan or project, it 
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is hard to argue that future recovery actions are restoration measures if they are aimed at 
proactively offsetting future damage to existing patches of protected habitats.  
Moreover, the CJEU’s rejection of a progressive approach to Articles 6(1) and (2) is in 
line with its previous case law. In a 2010 holding on the French Natura 2000 implementation 
rules, for example, the court decided that Natura 2000 contracts, aimed at realizing site-specific 
conservation objectives at a future time, could not exempt building projects from prior 
assessment. 110  While the context of the French case is slightly different from that in Orleans, it 
underlines the reluctance of the court to soften its understanding of what Article 6(3) requires in 
the context of integral planning. Along the same lines, the European Commission indicated in its 
2000 guidance document about Article 6 that, although conservation measures fall outside the 
scope of the assessment obligation in Article 6(3), “a non-conservation component of a plan or 
project which includes conservation management amongst its objectives may still require 
assessment.”111 So, mixed plans, which combine harmful development with restoration actions, 
still need to be assessed within the framework of the second sentence of Article 6(3). Of course, 
one might submit that the these recovery actions are autonomous and thus not strictly related to 
the port development. However, given the fact that the integrated development plan explicitly 
presented the restoration actions as a justification for the further port expansion, such an approach 
would not be viable either. In addition, in light of the additional requirement that is in order for 
offsets (see infra), it remains difficult to entertain that conservation measures that are already 
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111 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Managing Natura 2000 Sites, The Provisions of Article 6 of the 
‘Habitats’ Directive 92/43/ECC 32–33 (2000) (emphasis added). 
36 
 
required by virtue of Article 6(1) of the Habitats Directive in order to conserve and restore 
degraded Natura 2000 sites could still be used as offsets for future damaging port development.  
 
6.2. Limited Room for Adaptive Management Within the Context of Article 6(3)  
The Flemish government strongly argued that, because the restoration measures it contemplated 
had to be completed before the harbour expansion projects moved ahead, the application of 
Article 6(4) was pre-empted.  There would be no adverse effects, on balance, of the kind that 
Article 6(3) was intended to identify and assess. And this outcome was guaranteed by a binding 
timetable for project implementation. The court, nonetheless, disagreed. 
The court first reiterated its previous case law, in which it emphasized that an appropriate 
assessment needs to lead to definitive findings and conclusions capable of removing all 
reasonable scientific doubts as to the effects of the works proposed on the Natura 2000 sites 
concerned.112 The mere fact, in other words, of binding prescriptions to ensure that newly created 
nature core areas would become real before the construction of the Antwerp port facilities 
proceeded was not sufficient to meet the test posed by the precautionary principle. The court also 
emphasized that, since the wording of Article 6(3) makes no explicit reference to mitigating 
measures, the effet utile of Article 6 could only be preserved by treating measures taken under 
Article 6(4) as compensation.113 So the rationale of Orleans, correctly understood, is that 
proactive habitat creation, even it is fully implemented prior to a proposed project moving 
forward, can only to be counted as mitigation if its beneficial effects can be clearly identified and 
evaluated in an appropriate assessment. It is inappropriate to assume, in other words, that a 
                                                          
112 Joined Cases C-387/15 & C-388/15, 2016 EUR-Lex 583, at para. 50.  
113 Id. at paras. 58–59.  
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proposal to create new nature will effectively ensure the favourable conservation status of a 
Natura 2000 site. That prediction needs to be substantiated by evidence from the field. A strategy 
of in-advance mitigation or compensation implies a completely different approach to decision-
making for spatial planning in Europe. The assumption prior to Orleans was that offsetting 
measures would be implemented after project development began, leaving so-called interim 
losses unaddressed. Orleans stands this proposition on its head. And it raises other questions.  
For example, if restoration measures must now be shown to be effective before projects 
can proceed, in what sense can they still be regarded as mitigation? Are project developers now 
required proactively to conclude agreements with competent authorities in which they clearly 
define the restoration actions that will offset future development, which is yet to be further 
delineated during the following years? Are project developers obliged to wait until the beneficial 
effects linked to restoration actions have fully materialized on the ground before they can 
consider them in the context of an appropriate assessment?  
Orleans strongly suggests that the answers to all these questions are affirmative. And that 
is a ground-breaking turn in a development context where many decision-making procedures 
have a pro-development bias. The court is effectively urging developers to invest in restoration 
measures before they have final certainty about the future of their proposals. Even in situations 
where developers try to negotiate agreements with competent authorities to undertake proactive 
nature management measures in exchange for implicit consent to develop, no guarantee can be 
given that projects will finally be authorized because final assessments require evidence that the 
proactive measures have been implemented and are effectively working. The only way to bypass 
this strict interpretation of Article 6(3) is to opt for the risks and costs of demonstrating 
“imperative reasons of overring public interest” (IROPI) under Article 6(4).  
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From a nature protection perspective, the CJEU’s reassertion of a preventative approach 
within the context of Article 6(3) has advantages. In the long run, a less demanding mitigation 
strategy might, for example, undermine the level of environmental protection provided for the 
EU’s most valuable habitats and species114 -- a fear that is well-founded given the limited 
effectiveness of restoration measures in the context of offsetting schemes.115 Several recent 
studies have indeed revealed that offset practices often fail to take account of the many 
uncertainties linked to restoration actions, as well as the considerable time lags involved.116 
Moreover, an increasing reliance on proposing beneficial restoration measures at the early stages 
of project decision making risks creating the impression that promises to create new nature can be 
turned into a “license to trash”117 the nature that exists. The better principle is to avoid the 
destruction of the EU’s most valuable and threatened habitats from the outset of the development 
process and to regard it when it does occur as exceptional.118  
 
                                                          
114 See Schoukens & Cliquet (2016), supra note 85.  
115 David Moreno-Mateos et al., The True Loss Caused by Biodiversity Offsets, 192 BIOLOGICAL 
CONSERVATION 552, 552–59 (2015). 
116 See Michael Curran, Stefanie Hellweg & Jan Beck, Is There Any Empirical Support for 
Biodiversity Offset Policy?, 24 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 617, 617–32 (2014). 
117 See Renaud Lapeyre, Géraldine Froger & Marie Hrabanski, Biodiversity Offsets as Market-
Based Instruments for Ecosystem Services?, 15 ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 125, 125–33 (2015). 
118 Astrid van Teeffelen et al., Ecological and Economic Conditions and Associated Institutional 
Challenges for Conservation Banking in Dynamic Landscapes, 130 LANDSCAPE AND URBAN 
PLANNING 64, 64–72 (2014).  
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7. Wider repercussions: back to the roots of nature protection? 
 
7.1. Integrated Port Management 
Several lessons can be drawn from the preceding discussion.  The first is that Orleans was a 
major surprise for the Flemish authorities. They thought the European Commission had endorsed 
the nature compensation scheme used in the context of the Deurganck Dock as a prime example 
of sustainable port development. They characterized Orleans, by contrast, as an example of the 
procedural rigidity that arises when judges fail to understand the many compromises that must be 
reached before an ambitious nature restoration scheme can be formulated.119 Moreover, given the 
many jobs the new port development would create, an IROPI finding under Article 6(4) seemed 
to be little more than a procedural formality. The same governmental attitude towards derogation 
has been evident in other Member States, especially in the United Kingdom, where “it appears 
relatively easy for developers to establish the existence of IROPI.”120 And where the strict 
assessment rules set out by the Nature Directives are often treated as procedural formalities that 
will have only a limited impact on the final outcome of the decision-making process.121  
The disappointment with Orleans is understandable in the light of the rigid chronology 
the Flemish authorities built into their development strategy. In their view, the Saeftinghe Dock 
could only be developed after the implementation of the nature core areas had been declared 
“successful.” New development of the port area was explicitly made conditional on the 
                                                          
119 See BEHEERCOMMISSIE NATUUR LINKERSCHELDEOEVER, 
http://linkerscheldeoever.beheercommissienatuur.be/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
120 Clutten & Tafur, supra note 10, at 176. 
121 Wandesforde-Smith & Watts, supra note 14.  
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successful implementation of the restoration actions. But this overlooks the fact that for some of 
the habitat types involved, notably the salt grasslands, the viability of offsets would be hard to 
establish. And in the face of inconclusive monitoring results the project would stall. What the 
Flemish Government hoped to do was finesse the appropriate assessment by carefully 
choreographing an integrated project. But what is clear from Orleans and from earlier guidance 
issued by the European Commission is that the careful sequencing of nature creation with actual 
development activities is much less important to the success of integrated projects than an early 
start to coping with the damage projects are going to cause. The Commission said in 2011 that 
great care needed to be taken in following the sequence of steps outlined in Articles 6(3) and 
6(4), noting explicitly that projects expected on the basis of assessment to engender harmful 
effects could only proceed under the derogation clause,122 and that the only way to bypass 
derogation was to wait until the success of proactive nature management or restoration actions 
could be demonstrated.  
This does not, however, preclude the use of proactive restoration as a “compensatory 
measure” within the meaning of Article 6(4).123 Indeed, the proactive strategy built into the 
Regional Development Implementation Plan for the Port of Antwerp might even be seen as a 
model to be followed whenever derogation is invoked. A compensation scheme should be 
effective, the Commission said, “at the time the negative effects occur on the site concerned. 
                                                          
122 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidance on the Implementation of the Birds and Habitats Directive 
in Estuaries and Coastal Zones 30 (Jan. 2011). 
123 Joined Cases C-387/15 & C-388/15, 2016 EUR-Lex 583, at paras. 62–64.  
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Early implementation is of the essence.”124  The conclusion has to be then that restoration actions 
need to be implemented proactively, regardless of whether they are used in the context of Article 
6(3) or Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive. 
 
7.2. Taking Derogation for Granted 
A second lesson to be drawn from Orleans is that while application of the derogation clause is 
not per se an insurmountable hurdle for port development or for other major projects, its use is 
now subject to stringent conditions. As a general rule, the preservation of existing natural 
heritage at protected sites, such as those in the Natura 2000 Network, is always preferable to 
taking compensatory measures,125 and the mere fact that ambitious compensation schemes are 
available and have been promised, even if the promise is to implement them on a strict timetable, 
is not enough to get developments around the hurdle of complying fully with Article 6(4).  
Orleans and the cases that preceded it have, thus, made the derogation clause a crucial 
cornerstone of development decision-making in Europe. If Articles 6(3) and 6(4) are stringently 
applied, they will rule out the risk that unsustainable developments will adversely affect the EU’s 
most valuable protected sites. This helps to explain why the arguments put forward by the 
Flemish government in response to Orleans are missing the point. The strict balancing test 
required to sustain derogation goes beyond an assessment of whether impairment to habitats can 
be offset. Within the strict context of the alternatives assessment, the focus needs to be on those 
                                                          
124 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidance on the Implementation of the Birds and Habitats Directive 
in Estuaries and Coastal Zones 30 (Jan. 2011). 
125 See Case C-239/04 Comm’n v. Port., 2006 E.C.R. I-10183, Op. Advocate Gen. Kokott, para. 
35.  
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alternatives that better respect the integrity of Natura 2000 sites. The zero option – that is, doing 
nothing – must be seriously considered, as well as scenarios in which harbour expansion would 
be confined or consolidated within the boundaries of an existing port area.126 As illustrated by the 
alternatives assessment that preceded the Regional Development Implementation Plan, public 
authorities are often inclined to take the economic projections for future port traffic for granted, 
which renders it unlikely that less intrusive alternatives in terms of ecological damage will 
prevail in the context of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) or, whenever Natura 2000 
sites are damaged, the application of the derogation clause.  
Even so, the ruling in Grüne Liga Sachsen buttresses this restrictive approach. There, the 
CJEU held that the review of alternatives in the context of Article 6(4) “requires weighing the 
environmental consequences of maintaining or restricting the use of the works at issue, including 
closure or even demolition, on the one hand, against the public interest that led to their 
construction, on the other.”127 The economic costs of potential alternatives are “not of equal 
importance to the objective of conserving natural habitats and wild fauna and flora pursued by the 
Habitats Directive.”128 
Recent case law also makes it clear that the IROPI test embedded in Article 6(4) cannot 
be met merely because there is some prospect that a development will create economic benefits. 
                                                          
126 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidance Document on Article 6(4) of the ‘Habitats Directive’ 
92/43/EEC, Clarification of the Concepts of: Alternative Solutions, Imperative Reasons of 
Overriding Public Interest, Compensatory Measures, Overall Coherence, Opinion of the 
Commission 7 (Jan. 2007). 
127 Case C-399/14, (CJEU, Jan. 14, 2016), at para. 74. 
128 Id. at para. 77. 
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In Solvay, the CJEU held that an IROPI interest must be both public and overriding, meaning that 
it must be of such demonstrable importance that it can clearly overcome the interest in conserving 
nature. In principle, this is only likely to happen in exceptional circumstances.129 But the 
European Commission has also stressed that a public interest can only be overriding if it is a 
long-term interest.130 Competent authorities must then make a comprehensive analysis of whether 
a project passes the IROPI test. They cannot limit themselves to accepting the project proponent’s 
claims, which will tend to paint an overly positive picture of project benefits.131  
In the specific context of the Port of Antwerp, a question arises about whether the short-
term economic gains linked to the construction of an additional container dock should prevail 
over the preservation of old growth habitats that are already in a degraded state. There also needs 
to be an evaluation of the economic need for yet another big container dock when other docks are 
not used to full capacity and economic growth is sputtering.132  
                                                          
129 Case C-182/10, Marie-Noëlle Solvay and Others v. Région Wallonne, 2012 E.C.R., paras. 75–
76. 
130 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidance Document on Article 6(4) of the ‘Habitats Directive’ 
92/43/EEC, Clarification of the Concepts of: Alternative Solutions, Imperative Reasons of 
Overriding Public Interest, Compensatory Measures, Overall Coherence, Opinion of the 
Commission 8 (Jan. 2007). 
131 Clutten & Tafur, supra note 9, at 181. 
132 The Flemish Greens predict that the Saeftinghe Dock would lead to unacceptable 
environmental and mobility impacts, in an area already characterized by heavy fragmentation, 
bad air quality, and traffic congestion. See https://www.groen.be/nieuws/10-feiten-waarom-het-
saeftinghedok-de-verkeerde-keuze (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).  
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In short, while proactive nature compensation schemes might, even after the ruling in  
Orleans, pave the way for a more flexible application of the derogation clause, derogations 
remain exceptional rather than routine. More pointedly, nature compensation schemes are not a 
license to carry out a damaging project for which less intrusive alternatives are available, in the 
absence of a compelling public interest. The Orleans decision is in this sense a clear corrective to 
the recent tendency in Europe to allow economic factors to pre-empt strict assessments of both 
damaging projects and of the compensatory measures proposed to offset them.133  
 
7.3. Mitigation vs. Compensation Revisited 
The holdings in both Briels and Orleans make it clear that the benefits of mitigating adverse 
project effects cannot be claimed if the adverse effects are clear but the benefits of mitigation are 
prospective, meaning that they have not yet been quantified or realized on the ground. It is still 
the case that the rescheduling of a project to avoid, for example, interference with the breeding 
period of a protected species is legitimate mitigation, because it prevents detrimental effects from 
materializing in the first place. Similarly, realigning the path of a road to avoid vulnerable 
patches of protected habitat can also qualify as mitigation. Yet as a general rule future restoration 
actions are not eligible as mitigation measures in the context of Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive. 
More generally, the following conditions now need to be met before a measure can be 
labelled mitigation:  
                                                          
133 Nicolas De Sadeleer, Habitats Conservation in EC Law – From Nature Sanctuaries to 
Ecological Networks, in 5 YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN ENVTL. L. 215–52 (Thijs F.M. Etty et al. 
eds., 2005); McGillivray, supra note 75, at 449–50. 
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- the measure must be genuinely capable of avoiding or reducing the negative effects of a 
plan or project, with the aim of ensuring that the integrity of a site is not adversely 
affected; 
- the measure must be strictly related to the same Natura 2000 site and the same habitat or 
species that is impaired by the project; 
- the measure must form an integral part of or be functionally linked to the plan or project 
that impairs a Natura 2000 site; 
- the measure must not be part of the conservation measures Member States are required to 
implement by Article 6(1) and/or 6(2) of the Habitats Directive; 
- the measure’s effectiveness in avoiding or reducing the negative effects of a plan or 
project cannot be uncertain.134 
Measured against these criteria, do sophisticated schemes to create markets in banked 
biodiversity offset credits – often dubbed “habitat/species banking” – constitute mitigation?135 In 
some ways the proactive nature restoration strategy proposed for the Saeftinghe Dock could be 
interpreted as an attempt to implement this rationale, although there was no suggestion that 
credits could be traded outside the Port of Antwerp.  
The key difficulty here is that, although habitat banking might support a proactive approach 
to mitigation or compensation, and avoid interim losses, it does not pass the test of “like for like” 
                                                          
134 RALPH H. W. FRINS, MITIGATIE, COMPENSATIE EN SALDERING IN HET OMGEVINGSRECHT 
(2016).  
135 See, e.g., Joseph W. Bull et al., Biodiversity Offsets in Theory and Practice, 47 ORYX 369, 
369–80 (2013); Géraldine Froger et al., Towards a Comparative and Critical Analysis of 
Biodiversity Banks, 15 ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 152, 152–62 (2015).  
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offsets that both the CJEU and the European Commission have endorsed.136 One can imagine 
situations where port authorities purchase land in advance in order to create new breeding 
grounds for highly mobile species, such as protected terns, in order to offset future development 
actions on existing breeding grounds, which the birds will readily abandon. But this is a very 
limited set of circumstances, and one in which it is quite clear that new breeding grounds will 
work just as well as those that are lost. In other cases, involving old growth habitats or less 
mobile species, for example, the elegant solution that works for the terns is unlikely to be 
available. Or, if it is available, it would entail considerable delays that would not make it an 
attractive option for project developers.  
To some extent, the elaborate efforts made proactively to offset the damage to existing salt 
grasslands to accommodate the Saeftinghe Dock might be tagged as a major step towards habitat 
banking. They even seem to comply with the “like for like” rationale. But there are so many 
uncertainties surrounding the feasibility of recreating threatened salt grasslands in other locations 
outside the port area that it remains doubtful whether such progressive types of restoration 
strategies are consistent with the precautionary principle. Either way, the ruling in Orleans clearly 
                                                          
136 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidance Document on Article 6(4) of the ‘Habitats Directive’ 
92/43/EEC, Clarification of the Concepts of: Alternative Solutions, Imperative Reasons of 
Overriding Public Interest, Compensatory Measures, Overall Coherence, Opinion of the 
Commission 14 (Jan. 2007). See also EFTEC and IEEP, The Use of Market-Based Instruments 
for Biodiversity Protection – The Case of Habitat Banking, Technical Report for European 
Commission DG Environment 117–19 (Feb. 2010), 
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indicates that the room for more flexible offsetting schemes, such as habitat banking, remains 
extremely limited within the realm of the Nature Directives.   
 
7.4. Additionality: Achieving Net Gains in Comparison with the Baseline Scenario  
All the measures incorporated into the Regional Development Implementation Plan for the Port 
of Antwerp were intended to achieve two goals at the same time. First, they would arguably 
achieve favourable conservation status for the Natura 2000 sites affected and, second, they would 
offset the impairment of those sites. However, under Articles 6(1) and 6(2) of the Habitats 
Directive, authorities were already under an obligation to implement restoration and conservation 
measures to reverse on-going habitat degradation in the port area. In recent years, for example, 
both Flemish and Dutch authorities have intensified dredging activities to guarantee optimum 
accessibility to the Port of Antwerp. Hence the Article 6(1) and 6(2) measures were already 
necessary to avoid infringement actions by the European Commission.137 Some of the nature core 
                                                          
137 The Estuary Development Outline (2010) was approved by both the Dutch and Flemish 
governments in March 2005. It aimed at resolving the political tensions that have persisted for 
centuries between the Netherlands and the Flemish Region as to the management of the Scheldt 
Estuary, which is vital for the further development of the Port of Antwerp. The newly established 
policy strategy laid down a long-term strategy, to be reached by 2030, which has three main focal 
points: safety (maximum protection against flooding in the region), accessibility (optimum 
accessibility of the harbours on the Scheldt estuary via dredging activities), and natural 
environment (a dynamic, healthy natural environment). Inter alia, the Outline established clear-
cut conservation objectives for the SACs and SPAs present in the Scheldt Estuary. These 
commitments were then further translated in the 2005 Scheldt Treaties, which have been signed 
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areas included in the development plan for the Port of Antwerp were meant to comply with the 
conservation duties enshrined in Articles 6(1) and 6(2).138 
To what extent were the restoration measures included in the Regional Development 
Implementation Plan for the Port of Antwerp in line with the additionality requirement of 
European nature conservation law, a requirement which holds that mitigation or compensation 
measures taken in relation to new developments must provide a net positive contribution to 
conservation, above and beyond whatever contribution was needed to meet existing conservation 
commitments? The appropriate assessment carried out for the port expansion did not explicitly 
address this issue, even though the additionality principle has long been regarded as crucial to 
meeting the no net loss objective of European nature conservation policy, which holds that only 
those biodiversity benefits that are additional to a properly established baseline can count as valid 
mitigation, compensation, or offsets. 139   
The decision in Orleans preserves this view and, thus, perhaps inadvertently, closes the 
door on a so-called double dipping tactic whereby restoration measures needed to comply with 
                                                          
and ratified both by the Netherlands and the Flemish Region. At the Flemish level, the so-called 
Sigma Plan further implemented the sustainable approach to the Scheldt Estuary, by combining 
and balancing its natural, economic and socio-cultural functions. See 
http://www.vnsc.eu/publicaties/wetenschappelijke-publicaties-en-rapporten/100-
ontwikkelingsschets-2010-schelde-estuarium.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).  
138 See Joint answer given by Mr. Potočnik on behalf of the Commission to the Written Questions 
E-006402/11, E-006507/11, P-006822/11 (Sept. 15, 2011).  
139 Martine Maron et al., Locking in Loss: Baselines of Decline in Australian Biodiversity, 192 
BIOLOGICAL CONSERV. 504, 504–12 (2015). 
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obligations under Articles 6(1) and 6(2) of the Habitats Directive can also be counted as offsets 
for the adverse effects of a project under Articles 6(3) and 6(4).140 This rationale is 
understandable because the EU’s ambitious nature restoration targets,141 which aim for net gains, 
will not be met if restoration actions needed to stall on-going deterioration are immediately re-
used to offset the harmful effects of new developments.142  
From a policy perspective, the focus should be, first, on making degrading biodiversity 
more resilient, and only after this has been achieved through a proactive nature restoration 
strategy, should permits be issued for new and potentially harmful developments under Article 
6(3). Or, alternatively, one should clearly indicate that the purported offsets go beyond the 
autonomous conservation or restoration measures necessary to comply with Article 6(1) and 6(2) 
of the Habitats Directive. Admittedly, while some might submit that the rigidity of the CJEU in 
this respect could urge project developers such as port authorities to invest less in restoration 
                                                          
140 Joined Cases C-387/15 & C-388/15, 2016 EUR-Lex 583, at para. 42.  
141 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Our Life 
Insurance, Our Natural Capital: An EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 (2011, COM (2011) 244 
final). The Council of the European Union endorsed the Biodiversity Strategy in its June 21, 2011 
decision (EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 – Council Conclusions, 11978/11). 
142 The European Commission already specified in its 2000 Guidance on Article 6 of the Habitats 
Directive that “[m]easures required for the ‘normal’ implementation of the ‘Habitats’ or ‘Birds’ 
directives cannot be considered compensatory for a damaging project.” EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
Managing Natura 2000 Sites, The Provisions of Article 6 of the ‘Habitats’ Directive 92/43/ECC 
44–45 (2000). 
50 
 
actions, and ultimately put in jeopardy the conservation goals of the Habitats Directive itself, the 
rationale of the EU judges effectively contributes to averting a further net loss. Moreover, should 
more flexibility be shown under the habitat assessment rules, the risk exists that ecological 
restoration would become an almost exclusively development-driven activity. Accordingly, 
environmental degradation could become a prerequisite for finding the necessary financial 
goodwill and means to consider large-scale restoration efforts.  
 
8. Conclusion 
This analysis shows that, when located near Natura 2000 sites, port developments in Europe and, 
by extension, other major development plans and projects in Europe, can be difficult to reconcile 
with the preventative approach to nature conservation that the CJEU has determined is 
fundamental to the EU Nature Directives. Developers, and more specifically port authorities in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, have shown a remarkable willingness to make nature conservation 
measures an integral part of their planning for expansion. But this has not substantially alleviated 
the frustration they feel with the court’s steadfast embrace of the precautionary principle. The 
CJEU’s refusal to accept the legal soundness of an integral approach to project-linked nature 
restoration within the specific context of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive continues to 
impede permitting procedures. Even if nature management and restoration actions are proactively 
implemented, they can only be regarded as compensation measures in the context of the 
derogation clause. Proposals to restore or re-create natural habitats cannot, as a matter of law in 
Europe, be treated as a license for proceeding with projects for which less harmful alternatives 
exist or for which compelling and overriding reasons of public interest cannot be demonstrated.  
It remains to be seen whether and how port expansion schemes and other major project 
developments can move forward if they entail the destruction of estuarine and marine habitats in 
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Europe that are already in an unfavourable conservation status. The Port of Antwerp case 
indicates that, at least in some instances, the options for competent authorities to coordinate 
proactive nature conservation measures with future actions likely to be harmful to protected areas 
may be severely restricted. Critics might predict that this alleged rigidity undercuts the legitimacy 
of the Nature Directives. One might even go so far as to say that, because biodiversity 
conservation goals carry limited political weight in Europe, harmful developments are inevitable, 
no matter the time, energy and expense involved in subjecting them to procedures of analysis and 
assessment. In which case, why not accept that development proposals including robust 
ecological restoration measures are making the best of a bad situation, and let such projects 
proceed?  
The argument against this very tempting suggestion is that the benefits of nature 
restoration and re-creation measures are, under recent case law, too uncertain to turn around the 
poor conditions that now prevail in many, if not most, of Europe’s endangered habitats. The 
courts are of the view that it makes little sense to destroy the nature that remains in exchange for 
gains that are speculative. And this in turn strongly suggests that European port authorities, and 
project developers and planning authorities more generally, are better advised to read Orleans as 
an incentive to step up their efforts to restore the degraded protected areas within their 
jurisdictions, thus making them more resilient in the long run to absorb the environmental 
pressures that major new development projects are bound to entail. More innovative strategies 
which fail to observe the mitigation hierarchy are liable to be defeated in court.  
There is certainly nothing in Orleans that would prevent developers from proactively 
restoring or recreating nature, both on-site or off-site, near protected areas that stand to be 
affected by future development actions. And for project developers who operate in a context 
where degraded Natura 2000 sites are sure to be affected by their future plans, such ambitious 
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and proactive restoration strategies make even more sense. Instead of wasting time and money 
with ad hoc mitigation strategies of dubious legal soundness under Article 6(3), developers might 
be better off securing “restoration deals” with competent authorities in which both sides stipulate 
an “environmental baseline” against which future improvements to habitats and species can be 
measured. If proactive restoration goes beyond existing conservation duties and yields results 
before new planning procedures are initiated, it can be viewed as an additional instrument for 
achieving the EU’s 2020 biodiversity targets while justifying further development, even in the 
context of Natura 2000 sites.143 The downside is that under Orleans developers cannot reasonably 
anticipate the benefits of restoration measures that have yet to be proven successful on the 
ground, and competent authorities cannot, therefore, give developers definitive assurances that 
their projects will be able to move ahead. In other words, project developers are required to invest 
in further restoration actions without having received formal assurances that their future 
development plans can go ahead. Still, while the latter strategy might appear anachronistic, it 
might ultimately still constitute a more sensible pathway towards genuine sustainable 
development.  
Be that as it may, as long as EU judges are unwilling to depart from the mitigation 
hierarchy that implicitly underpins Article 6(3), developers ought to distinguish clearly between 
                                                          
143 It is provided that “by 2020, ecosystems and their services are maintained and enhanced by 
establishing green infrastructure and restoring at least 15% of degraded ecosystems.” Cliquet, 
Decleer & Schoukens, supra note 26, at 268. See also ANASTASIA TELESETSKY, AN CLIQUET & 
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measures that are needed to comply with the restoration duties required of them under Article 
6(1) and those that are taken as offsets under Articles 6(3) and (4).  
And when the derogation provision of Article 6(4) is invoked, Orleans is very clear that 
developments can only go ahead when there has been a very careful and explicit weighing and 
balancing of the conservation value of existing patches of habitat. This might be viewed as the 
imposition of an unnecessary administrative burden on major infrastructure projects such as port 
expansion, which are generally believed to be the key to future economic prosperity of a region 
or even an entire country. But from an environmental point of view it is highly desirable, 
especially in cases where projects entail the destruction of villages and the further degradation of 
protected areas that are already stressed. Orleans is thus a corrective to environmental 
assessments that in the past have been prone to give too much weight to the economic growth 
projections on which proposed projects are premised.  
Orleans also represents a call to look much more closely at other, less intrusive project 
alternatives to those proposed by the developer, and to favour scenarios that conserve or restore 
existing patches of habitat in protected areas. Individual development proposals ought to be 
framed in the wider perspective of sustainable development goals, so that competent authorities 
and other stakeholders can objectively assess the extent to which economic interests are being 
allowed to prevail over the in situ conservation of vulnerable patches of habitat. And this 
presupposes that, at least in some instances, projects will be denied because they cannot be 
reconciled with the continued existence of viable Natura 2000 sites. The very fact that the 
Flemish government, in reaction to the decision in Orleans, has recently announced that it will 
carry out a more comprehensive examination of all the available alternatives for the planned port 
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expansion only underscores this point.144 Instead of taking future port expansion as a steadfast 
premise, the new planning procedure will tackle the more broader question on how to achieve an 
increase of the container capacity in the wider ecological and societal context.145  
In summary, while the ruling in Orleans leaves limited room for developers to formulate 
and proceed with proposals that will adversely affect protected areas in Europe, it is a powerful 
reminder to developers that they have serious responsibilities to ensure sustainable development. 
Additional impairments to Natura 2000 sites that already have legal protection are only going to 
be permissible when restoration actions render them resilient to further change or when the 
overriding reasons of public interest for further impairing those sites have been conclusively and 
transparently demonstrated. This entails that restoration actions are no longer to be treated as a 
“one-size-fits-all-solution” for troublesome permitting procedures. Orleans makes the prevention 
of future significant damage to existing protected areas a vital component of European 
environmental law and policy, going forward. Given that the European Commission has recently 
                                                          
144 See Antwerps Saeftinghedok niet Langer Heilig Huisje, 
http://www.tijd.be/nieuws/archief/Antwerps_Saeftinghedok_niet_langer_heilig_huisje.9841177-
1615.art (last visited Mar. 19, 2017).  
145 Note that the Flemish Government did not wait for the final annulment of the strategic 
development plan by the Belgian Council of State (Council of State (2016), no. 236.837) to 
initiate a new strategic development procedure in order to accommodate the demands of the 
Antwerp Port Authority for additional container capacity within the context of the Port of 
Antwerp. This will be done through the integral planning procedure set out by the Decree of 25 
April 2014 on complex projects, which has set out a more participative and sequential approach 
to spatial planning for large infrastructure project in the Flemish Region.  
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completed the “Fitness Check Evaluation” of the Nature Directives,146 holding that the protection 
rules are “highly relevant” and “fit for purpose,”147 the preventative approach prevailing within 
the context of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive is likely here to stay. It remains to be seen to 
what extent the recent case law developments will also signal a paradigm shift towards more 
sustainable development proposals in Europe, but that is clearly the direction in which the recent 
jurisprudence points. 
▪▪▪ 
                                                          
146 According to the European Commission, the so-called fitness checks provide an evidence-
based critical analysis of whether EU actions are proportionate to their objectives and deliver as 
expected. They cover environmental, economic, and social aspects, and concern all EU policy 
areas. In the field of environment policy, the Commission has completed fitness checks of the EU 
legislation on freshwater and on waste. The fitness check of the EU Birds and Habitats Directives 
was initiated back in 2013. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps 
(2013), http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/docs/20131002-refit-annex_en.pdf ((last visited Mar. 
19, 2017).  
147 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document Fitness Check of the EU Nature 
Legislation (Birds and Habitats Directives) (2016), 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/fitness_check/docs/nature_fitness_check.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2017). .  
▪▪▪ 
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